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Abstract 
The growth patterns during the last three decades did not show 
any sign of convergence. A typically poor country in the early 
1960s did not experience a higher real growth. Hence there is no 
catching up of the standard of living of the rich countries by the 
poor countries. 
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I 
Neoclassical Growth Theory and Its Convergence Implication 
Are poor countries growing faster than rich countries and coming 
closer to them? Recently this has been a much-debated question 
in the so-called mainstream economics. This spurt of debate owes 
much to the - so-called 'new' growth theory propagated by 
Romer(1986,1990), Lucas(1988), Rebelo (1991) and many others. 
The new growth theory came as a challenge to the old -
neoclassical- growth theory pioneered by Solow(1986) and 
Swan(1956). Bringing in the role of human capital formation in 
growth, technical progress was endogenised and the law of 
diminishing returns to reproductive capital -the important 
cornerstone of the neoclassical growth theory - was questioned. 
A divergent growth pattern was now expected in contrast to the 
convergence implication of the neoclassical model. 
In the neoclassical model, poor countries with low ratios of 
capital to labour, have high marginal products of capital and high 
rates of return to capital; hence they tend to grow at high rates. 
'This tendency for low-income countries to grow at high rates is 
reinforced in extensions of the neoclassical models that allow for 
international mobility of capital and technology' (Barro, 1991, 
p.407). 
The New Growth Theory and its Divergence Implication 
The new growth theory assumes constant returns to a broad 
concept of reproducible capital which includes human capital; 
hence the growth rate of per capita product is independent of the 
starting level of per capita product. Romer(1990) took human 
capital as the key input to the research sector which generates 
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new products or ideas. So countries with greater initial stocks of 
human capital experience a more rapid rate of introduction of new 
goods and tend to grow faster. Thus the convergence implication 
of the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth theory has been 
theoretically challenged. 
Convergence Debate in Historical Perspective 
Both the convergence and divergence hypotheses are, however, 
very old, older than the Wealth of Nations (1776) by Adam 
Smith. An idea of convergence can be found in the writings of 
David Hume on 'specie-flow price mechanism' (Hume, 1752). 
This was criticised by Josiah Tucker (Tucker, 1774) who 
anticipated the essence of the new growth theory (Semmel, 1970; 
Bagchi, 1992). In Adam Smith's writings, on the other hand, the 
ideas of both convergence and divergence can be found (Elmslie 
and Milberg, 1996). 
In the early twentieth century, Veblen (1915) analysed the 
industrial development of Germany and England and pointed out 
'the advantages of relative backwardness'. Gershenkron (1952) 
updated and extended the work of Veblen to include Russia, 
France and Italy. The essence of the Veblen-Gershenkron 
'catching up' hypothesis is that the latecomers in industrialisation 
tend to grow faster because learning and imitation is typically 
cheaper and faster than is the original discovery and testing(see 
also Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Gomulka, 1987). 
Parallel to the convergence and catching up idea, the doctrine of 
uneven development became the core of the writings of the 
radicals such as Baran (1957), Frank (1967) and the Latin 
American structuralist/ dependency school.1 This idea can be 
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traced in the writings of less radicals such as Prebisch (1950), 
Singer (1950), Myrdal (1957) and Lewis (1977). 
Kaldor (1972, 1985) tried to explain the phenomenon of uneven 
development through cumulative causation of an initial 
productivity lead based on the existence of dynamic scale 
economies. Krugman (1981) formalised a similar idea in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework and showed that the country with a 
small head start in an industry will go on increasing its 
productivity advantage over the lagging countries due to the 
existence of external economies; through free trade it will 
compete out the lagging countries from the industiy. 
Statistical Debate in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, a fully fledged statistical debate started with the 
publication of historical time series of 16 industrialised countries 
from 1870 to 1979 (Maddison, 1982). This led Abramovitz 
(1986, p.386) to observe: 
These data enable us to observe the catch-up process in 
quantitative terms over a much longer span of time than 
was possible hitherto'. 
Baumol (1986) used these data and found through his regression 
analysis a strong evidence of convergence among the 16 
industrialised countries: a country with a lower GDP per worker 
in 1870 experienced a higher rate of growth of GDP per worker 
over the period of 110 years, 1870-1979. The finding of Baumol 
(1986) was challenged by De long (1988). He observed: 
'... Baumol's regression uses an ex post sample of 
countries that are now rich and have successfully developed. By 
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Maddison's choice, those nations that have not converged are 
excluded from his sample because of their resulting present 
relative poverty. Convergence is thus all but guaranteed... Only a 
regression run on an ex ante sample, a sample not of nations that 
have converged but of nations that seemed in 1870 likely to 
converge, can tell us whether growth since 1870 exhibits 
"convergence". The answer to this ex ante question- have those 
nations that a century ago appeared well placed to appropriate and 
utilize industrial technology converged?-is no.' (De long,1988, pp. 
1138-1139). 
Baumol (Baumol and Wolff, 1988) accepted the validity of this 
criticism and using Summers-Heston (1984) series found a strong 
evidence of convergence only in the upper income group but an 
evidence of divergence among the lower-income countries. This 
pattern has already been noted by others and later on confirmed 
by many others(see Sheehey,1996). An explanation of this pattern 
can be found in Abramovitz (1986); he argues that the potential 
to realise the 'advantages of relative backwardness' depends on 
certain 'social capabilities' that vary positively with income(for 
other explanations, see Azariadis et al.1990 and Becker et al., 
1990). 
'Conditional Convergence' 
Does this rejection of the 'absolute' convergence hypothesis go 
against the neoclassical growth theory pioneered by Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956) and support the 'new' growth theory of 
Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas(1988) and Rebelo(1991)? Recently 
the growth theorists have added this dimension to the convergence 
debate. The cross-country studies of Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. 
(1992), Barro et al (1992, 1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) found 
no evidence of absolute convergence; rather these studies 
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observed 'conditional' convergence - the countries that are similar 
in preferences, technologies, rates of population etc tend to 
converge in terms of per capita GDP and standard of living. This 
finding is taken as a support of the neoclassical growth theory as 
it is pointed out that the neoclassical growth theory predicts 
conditional convergence - the countries that are similar in all 
respects except for their initial level of output per capita are 
expected to converge to the same steady-state level of output per 
capita. However, using alternative econometric methods, some 
studies questioned this finding of conditional convergence and 
showed that the pattern of cross-country growth is consistent with 
new growth theory and its divergence implication (Durlauf 1996). 
Thus the debate has been turned into one of academic interest. It 
is no longer concerned with the more fundamental issue - whether 
a ty pical poor country can catch up with a rich country in the 
process of growth and development. Nor it is concerned with 
whether the global income inequality has a tendency to decline in 
the process of evolution of the world economy. It is basically 
concerned with whether Solow was night or wrong. 
A Critique of the Concept of Conditional Convergence 
There is a gross fallacy in the concept of conditional convergence. 
Poverty and saving-investment rate, for example, are related to 
each other in mutual causation - known as 'vicious circle of 
poverty' in the early development economics literature: a poor 
country is likely to have a low saving-investment rate because of 
its poverty, and again because of its low saving-investment rate, 
its productivity is low and so it has low per capita income. 
Population growth and poverty are also related. The well-known 
theory of demographic transition can be mentioned here. In the 
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post-Second World War period, the poor countries in general 
passed the first phase of high birth and death rates and low 
population growth, and reached the second phase of high 
population growth due to high birth rate and low death rate. The 
rich countries in general are in the third phase of low population 
growth due to low birth and death rates. Available data 
(UNCTAD, 1994, PP.430-5) show that during 1970-91, the rich 
('developed market economy' - hereafter called the 'North') 
experienced an annual average population growth rate of 0.8 per 
cent while the poor ('developing market economy' - hereafter 
called 'South')2 experienced a population growth rate of 2.4 per 
cent per annum - the rate is about 3 per cent for the poor Africa. 
School enrollment rates (emphasised in Barro, 1991) and 
dependency ratio(emphasised in Sheehey,1996) are also very 
much connected to poverty in mutual causation. 
Technological backwardness is another characteristic of a poor 
country. Substantial technological gap exists between the poor and 
the rich. Even for the club of the rich, OECD, Bernard and Jones 
(1996) found little evidence of convergence of manufacturing 
technologies over time. 
The conditional convergence hypothesis is, therefore, tautological: 
the standard of living of a poor country will eventually converge 
with that of a rich country if it possesses the basic characteristics 
of the rich country - the same advanced level of technological 
knowledge, the same high saving-investment rate, the same low 
rate of population growth due to mass literacy (particularly among 
the women) etc. It sounds ridiculous if one argues that a poor 
country, say, Ethiopia (with a per capita GDP of $49 in 1960) or 
Mali (with a per capita GDP of $38 in 1960) would catch up 
with half the standard of living of the USA (with a per capita 
GDP of $2877 in 1960) within 35 years(under the 2 per cent 
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conditional convergence obtained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin,1992 
and 1995 and many others), if Ethiopia or Mali had the same 
saving-investment rate as that of the USA, the same level of 
technological knowledge and the same rate of population growth 
etc. 
The whole debate on whether there exists conditional convergence 
or not is sterile. What is important from the point of view of 
political economy in general and development economics in 
particular is whether the present world scenario is one of 
absolute convergence. This is the issue once bothered David 
Hume and Josiah Tucker and later on bothered the scholars in 
Marxist tradition such as Paul Baran and Gunder Frank, the whole 
Latin American structuralist/dependency school and all sensible 
scholars in development economics. 
Therefore, the present paper is concerned with absolute 
convergence. It assembles some data from available source and 
examines the question of convergence. In Section II, the data 
source, methodology and the findings are presented. Summary and 
conclusions are given in the last section (Section III). 
II 
Casual Evidence of Divergence 
There are some casual evidence in favour of divergence (United 
Nations, 1976, pp.700-2 and UNCTAD, 1995, pp.337-41). The 
per capita GDP of the North in 1960 was $1500 and by 1993, it 
became $21875. During the same period, the per capita GDP of 
the South rose from $130 to $984; that of Africa rose from $130 
to $536, that of LAC rose from $320 to $2959 and that of Asia 
(excluding the Middle East) rose from $110 to $654. In ratio 
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terms, the per capita GDP of the North was 11.5 times of that of 
the South in 1960 and it became more than 22 times in 1993. In 
the case of Africa, the gap became more acute - from 11.5 in 
1960, the per capita GDP of the North became about 41 times of 
that of Africa in 1993. For Asia(excluding the Middle East), the 
corresponding figures are about 14 and 33 while for LAC, these 
are about 5 and 7. These figures also point out the growing gap 
between different regions of the South. The more rigorous study 
is undertaken below. 
The Present Study: Data Source and Methodology 
Recent studies on the issue of convergence are mainly based on 
various versions of the Penn World Table (Summers-Heston, 
1991). These series use 'international prices' to adjust for 
differences in the purchasing power of currencies. More recently, 
Nuxoll (1994) pointed out that these data have some downward 
bias in estimating growth rates of poor countries and upward bias 
in estimating growth rates of rich countries. Hence the series may 
favour the divergence hypothesis. It was observed: 
'International prices are useful for adjusting GDP estimates for 
differences in price level; they are certainly preferable to using 
exchange rates. However, using domestic prices to measure 
growth rates is more reliable, because those prices characterize 
the trade-offs faced by the decision making agents, and hence 
they have a better foundation in the economic theory of index 
numbers' (Nuxol, 1994, p. 1434). 
Our study is based on national accounts statistics; data are 
collected from different UN publications. From UNCTAD (1994, 
1995), annual growth rates of real GDP per capita are collected 
for a sample of 110 countries over the period, 1960-93 divided 
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into a number of subperiods/ 1960-70,1970-75 1975-80 1980 
85, 1985-90, 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93. The growth rates arc 
calculated by using data for all the years of each subperiod(not 
just the beginning and end year data) by fitting an exponential 
trend equation. From United Nations (1976), the 1960-figures for 
GDP per capita (in US $) are collected for all these countries.4 
BY and large our sample selection is determined by the ready 
availability of data.5 The sample consists of 24 countries of the 
North and 86 countries of the •South' (42 countries from Africa 
18 countries from Asia, 24 countries from Latin America and 
Caribbean, LAC and 2 countries from Oceanea). 
The growth rates of real GDP per capita for each count™ over 
different subpenods are plotted against its 1960-GDP per'capita 
(log of dollar values) in a scatter diagram (Figure 1). The scatter 
of points shows some evidence of divergence. This is confirmed 
by our regression analysis. 
Regression Analysis: Strong Evidence of Divergence 
As in Baumol (1986), a semi-log linear relationship is fitted: 
Y i t = a + b .log X l60 ( 1 ) 
where Y lt is the annual rate of growth of real GDP per capita 
for the i-th country in the t-th penod, X l60 is its GDP per 
capita m 1960, a and b are the intercept and slope parameters 
(respectively) to be estimated from the data collected here. 
The Equation (1) is fitted through the OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares)-procedure to the whole sample (110 countries and 867 
observations). Table 1 reports the estimates. The estimates of the 
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regression coefficient (slope), b and its t-ratio given in parentheses 
show a positive relationship (of very high statistical significance) 
between the initial GDP per capita and its subsequent growth rate 
in real terms. This implies that poor countries with lower per 
capita GDP in 1960 experienced a lower real rates of growth in 
the GDP per capita than the countries with higher GDP per capita. 
That means, the gap between the per capita GDP levels of poor 
and rich countries widened during the period of our study. 
However, there exists a strong evidence of the problem of 
heteroscedasticity and so t-ratios are reestimated through the 
procedure of White (1980).6 These are also reported in Table 1. 
This process of tackling the problem of heteroscedasticity does 
not alter the conclusion. 
The question is whether the same divergent relationship can be 
found for the two subgroups, the North and the South. Two 
separate scatter diagrams are drawn for the two sub-groups 
(Figures 2 and 3). The scatter of points for the North shows some 
evidence of convergence (Figure 2) and that for the South shows 
the opposite (Figure 3). 
To examine whether the relationship postulated in Equation (1) is 
different for the North, one useful procedure is to add intercept 
and slope dummies. Assume that the intercept and slope 
parameters of the North and the South are different: a3 and b5 for 
the South and a^  and bn for the North (respectively). So there are 
two equations: 
Equations (2) and (3) can be combined into a multiple regression 
Y i t = a3 + bs .log X 
Y it = a„ + bn .log X 
it 
i60 
(2) 
(3) 
1 1 
with the aid of dummies: 
Yit = a, + b..log X l60 + an,.DNit + bn..SDNlt (4) 
where DNit is the intercept dummy = 1 for the 24 countries of the 
North and = 0 for other countries, SDNjt is the slope dummy = 
DNlt.X i6o ~ X i60 for the North and - 0 for other countries, a^ 
= a„ - a, and bn5 = bn - bs. 
Equation (4) is fitted to the whole sample. The estimated equation 
is: 
Yit = -4.28 + 1.06 log X i60 + 9.9 DNit - 1.61 SDNit (5) 
(-3.80) (4.85) (4.21) (4.42) 
where R bar square = 0.04, F = 12.43 and Durbin-Watson statistic 
(DW) = 1.45 (White estimate of t-ratios in parentheses in view of 
the problem of heteroscedasticity). 
The estimates given in Equation (5) show that the South 
experiences a strong evidence of divergence (the estimate of b5 is 
positive and statistically significant); the relationship is 
structurally different for the North (both dummies are statistically 
significant). The values of the coefficients of the dummies 
indicate that \ > a, and bn < b3 and give the clue that the 
Southern experience of divergence may not be shared by the 
Northern countries. The observation of a statistically significant 
higher level of intercept an > a,) can be taken as an indication 
that the growth rate of the Northern countries, in general, are 
higher than those of the Southern countries. 
In view of the findings of the dummy variable analysis, Equation 
(1) is fitted separately to the two subsamples, The North (24 
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countries, 192 observations) and the South (86 countries, 675 
observations). The estimates are again reported in Table 1 (panels 
2 and 3). For the North, there is some evidence of convergence -
the slope parameter is negative and significant at 5 per cent 
level. But there exists a strong evidence of the problem of 
heteroscedasticitv. The White estimate of the t-ratio of the slope 
parameter shows that the convergence is not robust - the slope is 
not significant at 5 per cent level. At best, it can be concluded 
that the existing gap among the countries of the North did not 
widen. The relatively poor countries of the North such as Greece, 
Portugal and Spain did not come closer to the richer countries 
such as the USA and Canada. 
For the South,on the other hand , a strong evidence of divergence 
has been found (thereby confirming the findings of the dummy 
variable analysis). To examine whether the different regions of 
the South face the same divergent relationship, the dummy 
variable analysis is conducted for the South-subsample. The fitted 
regression is 
Ylt = as' + b/.log X l 6 0 + a^.DA,, + b^.SDA,, + 
als.DLit + bis ,SDNlt (6) 
where DAlt (DLit ) is the intercept dummy = 1 for 42 (24) 
countries of Africa (the Latin America including the Caribbean, 
LAC) and = 0 for other countries, SDAlt (SDLlt ) is the slope 
dummy = Xj60 for Africa (LAC) and = 0 for other countries; a,' 
and b5' are the intercept and slope parameters for the South (less 
Africa and LAC); a^, b^, a)s and bls are the coefficients of the 
dummies used. 
Fitting Equation (6) to the South-subsample, the following 
estimates are obtained: 
1 3 
« • • n • 
• • • • • • • 
• M« • % • • • I* * • 
• • r T » " * 
• • • • • t • • 
-
M • •« • • 
• M M • • 
• 
• • M • • • 
• • M • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
M-—a» W * » 
en 
VJD 
CO 
CD 
CSJ 
LT> 
r-
K U H5 CJ Q a u t n U fi ft-H +J is 
CD K O 3 X K <E t-> W CO 
M U +> X t-l 
u o 
+•> 
3 0 M J, "G to O 
T3 J-E OJ id ft 
its 
— +J 
a o id oj u ~ u {4 M u w a m cn a 1 a o 
UD 1 cn 
s 
cn d 
e a 
u « U O 3 
-M U u 1) -q a 
a a — <=> 
CO e « 
O it! OJ u <d -H <M 
u o 
• • •• • • • • • • 
• • • • • * 
M • • *N 
•• • • Mi • • * • • • • • • • 
A • a i • 
• v r ^ t . • 
v r ^ W 4 • • ; 
m m • • 
TOS.-C a l 
• I H • ' ' * . ; - 1 •• • • 
• «• * r if* a ( 
• \ M l * " s • • 
• * h ••• • 
• •*• V • • • mm • 
• • •< 
• • • • 
N 
<JS 
cn 
in 
CO ^ 
Ln <r> v CO CO 
in a <J3 cn 
a u 
<=> fc, « 3 
iC 
•p u, 
a « 
o 
TT t, 
rs. m a rr ~ to o 
m 
in 
\0 
k u i b — a u a ns a — « 
W K 0 3 H I K C H W M 
Y it = -4.64 + 1.53 log X l60 - 0.08 DAit -0.51 SDAlt + 
(-1.90) (3.16) (-0.03) (-0.85) 
0.01 DT,it -0.53 SDLit 
(0.004) (-0.77) (7) 
where R bar sq =0.10, F = 16.81 and DW = 1.56 
(t-ratios in parentheses). 
The estimates given in Equation (7) indicate that the strong 
evidence of divergence experienced by (the 18 countries of) Asia 
and (the 2 countries of) Oceanea combined together is shared by 
(the 42 countries of) Africa and (the 24 countries of) LAC 
without any significant difference in structural parameters (slope 
and intercept). The CUSUM Squares test, based on the OLS 
residuals of Equation (1) fitted to the South, confirms the findings 
of the dummy variable analysis. 
Fitting Equation (1) to the different regions of the South such as 
Africa, Asia and LAC, a strong evidence of divergence has been 
found in each case(see Table 1, panels 4-6). In each case, there 
is no evidence of instability in the parameters estimated (the 
CUSUM Squares tests findings). That is to say, the South and its 
each region are homogeneous in regards to the experience of 
divergence. 
What has been observed by making the North-South distinction 
can also be observed more clearly if the whole sample is divided 
into two groups on the basis of initial GDP per capita: Poor(with 
initial GDP per capita less than or equal to $500) and Rich (with 
initial GDP per capita greater than $500). Fitting Equation (1) to 
the two groups, a strong evidence of divergence has been found 
for the 'poor' while an insignificant evidence of convergence has 
been observed in the case of'rich' (Table 1, panels 7 and 8). 
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Reversal of Divergence at the Top? 
From the foregoing analysis, the conclusion that follows is that 
the divergence hypothesis holds good for the relatively low 
income countries (the South is dominated by these countries); it 
does not hold for the high income countries (the North is 
dominated by these countries). Is there any threshold level of 
initial income level after which the divergent hypothesis will 
cease to hold? An attempt to answer this question can be made 
by fitting a quadratic equation to the whole sample: 
Y 1t = c + d. X i60 + e(Xl60)2 (8) 
where c, d and e are parameters to be estimated. 
The estimates (with due care to the problem of heteroscedasticity) 
confirm the slowing down of the force of divergence with the rise 
in the initial GDP per capita across the countries(note the 
negativity of the estimate of e): 
Y i t = 0.57 + 0.0026 X ) 6 0 - (0.10/105) (Xi60)2 (9) 
(2.67) (4.76) (-4.25) 
where R bar square = 0.02, F = 8.21 and D-W = 1.42 (White 
estimate of t-ratios are in parentheses). 
Equation (9) shows that the higher the initial GDP per capita, the 
higher is the growth rate of real GDP per capita; but there is a 
level of GDP per capita at which the rate of growth is maximum 
after which the convergence hypothesis holds good - the higher 
the GDP per capita the lower is the rate of growth. The value of 
the GDP per capita at which the rate of growth is maximum is 
given by d/2e. Putting the estimates of d and e from Equation (9), 
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the GDP per capita at which the rate of growth is maximum is 
calculated; it is $1300. 
On the basis of this threshold level of income, two groups are 
made: divergent group with the initial GDP per capita at or below 
$1300 and the convergent group with the initial GDP per capita 
above $1300. Altogether 99 countries belong to the divergent 
group and 11 countries belong to the convergent group.7 
Fitting Equation (1) to each group, it is observed that the 
divergent group experiences a strong evidence of divergence but 
the convergent group experiences neither convergence nor 
divergence of statistical significance (see Table 1, panels 9 and 
10). This shows that for the top eleven countries who were 
already rich in 1960, the subsequent growth of real income(per 
capita) has no relationship with the initial level of income. 
Excluding these top eleven countries, the others have growth 
pattern in accordance with the divergence hypothesis. 
This conclusion can be contrasted with that of Baumol and Wolff 
(1988) and Sheehey (1996). Their studies observed convergence 
for the top 17/14 countnes(respectively) and divergence for the 
rest. Their source of data, sample coverage and period of study 
are different. Moreover, as Baumol and Wolff(1988) admitted, 
'they compare only 1950 and 1980, with no attention to 
intermediate year figures' (Sheehey, 1996 did not mention the 
process of his growth rate calculation). Perhaps more important 
point is that the problem of heteroscedasticity was not given due 
attention. Our result is also in keen contrast to the formation of 
convergence clubs of rich and poor, expected in Quali (1996) and 
in some theoretical growth models (see Galor,1996). 
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Conclusion 
III 
The growth pattern during the last three decades did not show any 
sign of convergence. A typically poor country in the early 1960s 
did not experience a higher real growth. Hence there is no 
catching up of the standard of living of the rich countries by the 
poor countries. This is true for the North; this is true for the 
different regions of the South(Africa, Asia and Latin America) 
and for the South as a whole. There is a strong evidence that the 
growth patterns are divergent - instead of any catching up, the 
gap in the standard of living between the poor and the rich 
countries increased in the post-Second World War period studied 
in this paper. There is one qualification - the force of divergence 
slows down with the rise in income( per capita) across the 
countries and there exists a group of highly rich countries which 
experienced no divergence among themselves( nor any 
convergence). 
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Table 1 
Per capita Gross Domestic Product, 1960 and Its Real 
Rate of Growth, 1960-93: 
Pooled Regression Results 
-: Estimates" :-
Sample a, b, R Bar Square F D-W 
group Intercept slope 
t-ratios) 
i 
T. WHOLE SAMPLE (110 countries, 867 
observations)!) 
-1.96 0.58 0.03 23.52 1.43 
(-2.94) (4.85) 
[-2.99] [5.32] 
2.NORTH (24 countries, 192 observations) 
5.65 -0.55 0.02 4.21 1.32 
(3.02) (-2.05) 
[2.73] [-1.89] 
3.SOUTH (86 countries, 675 observations) 
-4.28 1.06 0.03 24.62 1.45 
(-3.95) (4.96) 
[-3.80] [4.85] 
4.AFRICA (42 countries, 326 observations) 
-4.72 1.02 0.02 6.88 1.64 
(-2.55) (2.62) 
5.ASIA (18 countries, 142 observations) 
-6.11 1.84 0.11 19.12 1.50 
(-2.90) (4.37) 
6. LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN (24 
countries, 191 observations) 
-4.63 1.00 0.02 5.36 1.53 
(-1.88) (2.32) 
,18 
Table 1 contd. 
Estimate" :-
a, b, R Bar Square F D-W 
Intercept slope 
(t-ratios) 
7. POOR with 1960-GDP per capita ^ $500 (86 
countries, 677 observations) 
-5.28 1.27 0.04 30.32 1 .46 
(-4.54) (5.51) 
[-4.34] [5.37] 
8. RICH with 1960-GDP per capita > $500 (24 
countries, 190 observations) 
5.63 -0.55 0.004 1.71 1.49 
(1.89) (-1.31) 
[1.77] [-1.25] 
9. Divergent Group with 1960-GDP per capita <: 
$1300 (99 countries, 779 observations) 
3.38 0.87 0.04 29.77 1.44 
(-3.98) (5.46) 
[-3.98] [5.67] 
10. Convergent Group with 1960-GDP per capita > 
$1300 (11 countries, 88 observations) 
0.23 0.17 -0.01 0.04 1.47 
(0.03) (0.18) 
[0.04] [0.22] 
a A simple semi-log linear relationship is 
fitted: 
Yit = a + b .log Xi60 
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The equation is fitted through the OLS procedure. Chi-Square and 
F-tests of heteroscedasticity are conducted on the basis of 
regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values. If the 
problem of heteroscedasticity is found, the t-ratios are reestimated 
on the basis of White(1980)'s covariance matrix. These t-ratios are 
given in third brackets. 
b The whole sample covers 110 countries. 
South ('Developing Market Economy' - 86 countries): 
Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Benin, 
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad. 
Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana. 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi. 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, 
Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia (42 countries from 
Africa); Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela, Barbados, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras. 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad & Tobago. 
Venezuela (24 countries from the Latin America and Caribbean. 
LAC); Cyprus, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mynamar, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand (18 
countries from Asia), Fiji and Papua New Guinea (2 countries 
from Oceania) . 
North ('Developed Market Economy'- 24 countries): 
Canada, USA, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
Australia.New Zealand, South Africa and Japan. 
2 0 
Notes 
1. For collection of some papers written in this Latin American tradition, 
see Seers, 1981. 
2 In UN compilation of data, the market economy world excludes ex-
Socialist countries(former Soviet bloc countries and China). It is 
divided into two sub-groups - the 'developed' and 'developing'. The 
'developed' covers all the 'market economy' countries of Europe, USA, 
Canada, Japan, Israel, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The 
rest of the 'market economy' countries constitute 'developing' group. 
3 For some countries we do not have data for all the periods, 1990-91, 
'91-'92 and '92-'93. 
4 For some poor countries 1960-GDP figures are not available. So we 
have used 1963 figures for some countries and 1970-figures for some 
countries. We do not expect any substantial alteration of the basic 
results. 
5 Major petroleum exporters such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia are deliberately excluded from the sample. Their real GDP per 
capita showed high negative growth because of the OPEC strategy of 
output restrictions and price increase. 
6 Under condition of heteroscedasticity, one cannot say with certainty 
whether the OLS estimated standard errors are too low or too high. 
White(1980)'s estimate is robust to most types of heteroscedasticity. 
7 The top eleven countries on the basis of 1960-GDP per capita are: 
USA, Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Iceland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, Australia and New Zealand. 
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